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Abstract
DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered
family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines
a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides
greater expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are: the buyers are risk-neutral; the
random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated. We
show that this revenue ranking holds for the second price auction in the case of risk-aversion.
However, it does not hold if affiliation is relaxed to a less restrictive form of positive dependence,
namely first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). We define the relative strong steepness of
families of securities and show that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for comparing
two families in the FOSD case. All results extend to the English auction.
JEL classification: D44; D82; G00
1 Introduction
Consider auctioning an asset that is a resource to be developed for profit by the winning buyer. It
is common in such auctions to require bids in the form of securities whose values to the seller are
tied to the eventual realized value of the asset. As an alternative to simply soliciting cash bids for
the asset, for instance, a seller may require buyers to compete in terms of the equity share that the
seller retains of the asset’s profits. Other common securities used in bidding include debt and call
options. DeMarzo et al. (2005) develop a general theory of bidding with securities in the first price
and the second price auctions. Bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities and
the paper focuses on the importance of the choice of the family of securities to the seller’s expected
revenue. The paper defines a partial ordering of families based on the notion of steepness (to be
made precise in Section 3) and shows that the steeper family of securities provides higher expected
revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are made to prove this result: (i) buyers are risk-neutral ;
(ii) the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated.
Risk neutrality is a severe restriction for a financial model. Affiliation is an extremely restrictive
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form of positive dependence.1
Our objective in this paper is to explore in the case of the second price auction the dependence
of the revenue ranking of families of securities upon these two assumptions.2 We work with a
symmetric interdependent values model on the lines of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and risk averse
buyers. We consider two additional forms of positive dependence, namely, a monotone likelihood
ratio (MLR) property, which is weaker than affiliation;3 and a first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD) property, which is weaker than the MLR property. FOSD captures the idea that the
observation by a bidder of a higher signal makes larger values of the other variables more likely.
The additional restriction to either MLR or affiliation is attributable to their mathematical value
and is typically not motivated in any practical sense. Each of these three positive dependence
assumptions has been extensively used in both auction theory and information economics.
Our main results are the following:
(i) A steeper family of securities provides higher expected revenue to the seller even with risk
averse buyers and assuming that the values are positively dependent on signals in the MLR
sense. We in this sense extend the result of DeMarzo et al. (2005) to the case of risk aversion
and a richer informational environment.
(ii) We show with an example that if the notion of positive dependence among values and signals
of buyers is relaxed further from MLR to FOSD, then even for risk neutral buyers the revenue
ranking of families of securities of DeMarzo et al. (2005) no longer holds.
(iii) We strengthen steepness to a property that we call strong steepness in order to rank families
of securities in the case of FOSD and either risk neutral or risk averse buyers. Relative strong
steepness is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for comparing two families of securities
in this case: one family generates a higher expected revenue for the seller than a second family
for all instances of our model satisfying FOSD if and only if it is strongly steeper than the
second.
(iv) Finally, we show that the above results extend to the case of the English auction.
It is worth emphasizing that DeMarzo et al. (2005) establish only sufficiency of relative steepness as
a condition to rank two families of securities according to the revenue realized by them if affiliation
is the notion of positive dependence. By contrast, we show that relative strong steepness is both
necessary and sufficient for ranking two families of securities according to the expected revenue
realized by them if FOSD is the notion of positive dependence. Furthermore, our proofs are
more straightforward than those inDeMarzo et al. (2005) and do not require its strong regularity
1de Castro (2010) shows that the set of affiliated probability density functions for two random variables is the
complement of an open and dense set in the space of continuous probability density functions under an appropriate
topology and has zero measure under an appropriate measure.
2In addition to the second price auction, DeMarzo et al. (2005) also rank families of securities in the case of
the first price auction. An additional restriction on the set of securities and the dependence of values and signals
beyond affiliation is required in this analysis (i.e., the log-supermodularity of each buyer’s expected profit, which
is Assumption C in the paper). Our interest in this paper is in exploring the effect of relaxing the assumption of
affiliation and not restricting it further. We have not been able to carry out the analysis for the first price auction
at this level of generality. We do, however, discuss the extension of our results in Section 5 to the commonly used
English auction, which is not considered in DeMarzo et al. (2005).
3DeMarzo et al. (2005) assume the MLR property for the case of independent private values and affiliation for the
case of interdependent values. For independent private values, the MLR property and affiliation are equivalent.
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assumption on the probability density of return conditioned on a buyer’s signal. We accomplish
this mainly by exploiting the properties of concave functions, which in particular is what allows
the consideration of risk averse buyers in our analysis.
Our paper complements recent work concerning the impact of security choice on the seller’s
expected profit from auctions. Che and Kim (2010), Kogan and Morgan (2010), and Jun and
Wolfstetter (2012) study how the choice of security affects the incentives of the winning bidder in
choosing either a level of investment or effort that in turn affects the expected return from the asset.
The first case concerns adverse selection while the second concerns moral hazard among bidders.
In each case, the ranking of securities based on the seller’s net expected profit does not agree with
the ranking according to relative steepness in the sense of DeMarzo et al. (2005). None of these
three papers, however, explore the effect of risk aversion or the role of the positive dependence
assumption in their assessment of security bids.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model, notation, and definitions.
Section 3 extends the revenue ranking of families of securities of DeMarzo et al. (2005) to risk
averse buyers. Section 4 shows that this ranking is not preserved under a more general form of
positive dependence, i.e., FOSD. The revenue ranking of families of securities based on strong
steepness is then presented. Section 5 provides a brief overview of how the results of Sections 3
and 4 extend to the case of the English auction. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Model, Notation, and Assumptions
Consider N buyers competing for a resource that a seller wants to sell. Each buyer has a value for
the resource that is unknown to him; however, each buyer has some information (signal) about the
value of the resource. The signal of a buyer is known only to him, but it may be informative to
other buyers in the sense that it may improve their respective estimates of the value of the resource.
We model this by assuming that the value of the resource to a buyer n, denoted by xn, is a
realization of a nonnegative random variable Xn, unknown to him. This is the profit to buyer n
from developing the resource in the absence of any payments to the seller but after taking into
account the variable costs. A buyer n privately observes a signal yn through a realization of a
random variable Yn that is correlated with (X1, X2, . . . , XN ). A winning buyer needs to invest
a fixed amount I ∈ R, which is the same for each buyer, to develop the resource. We allow for
negative values of I; a negative value represents a subsidy by a third party that goes to the winner
to help develop the resource. As in DeMarzo et al. (2005), we assume that the realization of Xn is
observed ex-post by the seller and buyer n if buyer n wins and subsequently uses the resource. The
joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variables Xn’s and Yn’s is common
knowledge.
Let x , (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) denote a vector of values and let the random vector (X1, X2, . . . , XN )
be denoted by X. A vector of signals y and the random vector Y are defined similarly. We use
the standard game theoretic notation of x−n , (x1, . . . , xn−1, xn+1, . . . , xN ), and similarly for X−n,
y−n, and Y−n.
Let FX,Y(x,y) denote the joint CDF of (X,Y). It is assumed to have the following symmetry
property:
Assumption 1. The joint CDF of (Xn, Yn,Y−n), denoted by FXn,Yn,Y−n(xn, yn,y−n), is identical
for each n and is symmetric in its last N − 1 arguments (i.e., in the coordinates of y−n).
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Assumption 1 allows for a special dependence between the value of the resource to a buyer and his
own signal, while the identities of other buyers are irrelevant to him. The model reduces to the
independent private values model if (Xn, Yn) is independent of (X−n,Y−n) for all n, to the pure
common value model if X1 = X2 = . . . = XN , and includes a continuum of interdependent value
models between these two extremes. Because of Assumption 1, the subsequent assumptions and
analysis are given from buyer 1’s viewpoint.
The set of possible values that each Xn can take is assumed to be an interval [x, x] and the
set of possible values that each Yn can take is assumed to be an interval [y, y]. Assume that the
joint probability density function (pdf) of the random vector Y, denoted by fY(y), exists and is
positive for all y ∈ [y, y]N . By Assumption 1, fY(y) is symmetric in its N arguments. Define the
random variable Z1 as the largest among Y2, Y3, . . . , YN , i.e., Z1 , max{Y2, Y3, . . . , YN}; denote a
realization of Z1 by z1.
It is commonly assumed in auction theory that the observation of a larger signal corresponds
to more favorable estimates of the value of the resource. This is captured by first order stochastic
dominance. The specific property that we need in our analysis of the second price auction is as
follows:
Definition 1 (FOSD). The random variable X1 is positively dependent on the random variables
(Y1, Z1) in the first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) sense if for any x1, 1−FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1)
is nondecreasing in y1 and z1, where FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) is the CDF of X1 conditioned on Y1 = y1
and Z1 = z1.
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The following characterization of FOSD is well known:
Lemma 1. FOSD is equivalent to E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] being nondecreasing in y1 and z1 for
any nondecreasing function h : R 7→ R for which the expectation exists.
The monotone likelihood ratio property and affiliation are two more restrictive notions of posi-
tive dependence among variables that are also commonly used in auction theory. The versions that
we use here are as follows:
Definition 2 (MLR). Assume that for any y1 and z1, the pdf of X1 conditioned on Y1 = y1 and
Z1 = z1, denoted by fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1), exists and is positive everywhere on [x, x]. The random
variable X1 is positively dependent on the random variables (Y1, Z1) in the monotone likelihood ratio
(MLR) sense if fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1)/fX1|Y1=ŷ1,Z1=ẑ1(x1) is nondecreasing in x1 for any y1 ≥ ŷ1 and
z1 ≥ ẑ1.
Definition 3 (Affiliation). Assume that the joint pdf of (X1,Y), denoted by fX1,Y(x1,y), exists
and is positive everywhere on [x, x]× [y, y]N . The random variables (X1,Y) are affiliated if
fX1,Y((x1,y) ∨ (x̂1, ŷ))fX1,Y((x1,y) ∧ (x̂1, ŷ)) ≥ fX1,Y(x1,y)fX1,Y(x̂1, ŷ),
for any (x1,y) and (x̂1, ŷ) in the support of (X1,Y). Here “∨” denotes coordinatewise maximum
and “∧” denotes coordinatewise minimum.
4With the exception of the discussion of English auctions in Section 5, the properties “FOSD” and “MLR” in this
paper specifically concern positive dependence of X1 with respect to (Y1, Z1).
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Under Assumption 1, the following relationship between affiliation, MLR, and FOSD holds:5
Lemma 2. Affiliation implies MLR and MLR implies FOSD.
Our focus is on comparing MLR and FOSD. Lemma 2 implies that results obtained by assuming
FOSD hold if MLR is assumed instead, and results obtained by assuming MLR hold if affiliation is
assumed instead. It is common in auction theory to justify the assumption of either affiliation or the
MLR property by citing either the defining property of FOSD or the property that characterizes
it in Lemma 1.6 The relationship in Lemma 2, however, does not go in the reverse direction:
affiliation is strictly stronger than MLR,7 and, as discussed further in Section 4, MLR is strictly
stronger than FOSD.
The buyers are assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral. Each buyer has the same von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility of money, denoted by u : R→ R, which is concave (possibly linear), increasing,
and normalized so that u(0) = 0. Henceforth, the term risk averse includes risk neutral behavior.
The seller is risk neutral. Conditioned on any y1 and z1, the expected utility of the resource to
buyer 1 without any payments is assumed to be positive, i.e., E [u(X1 − I)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > 0.
Thus, the buyers who compete for the resource expect to make a positive profit from utilizing it.
As in DeMarzo et al. (2005), buyers bid with securities from some ordered family. Let Φ ,
{φ(·, b) | b ∈ [b, b]} be a family of securities parametrized by b. A bid b of buyer 1 denotes his
willingness to pay an amount φ(x1, b) to the seller if X1 = x1. The interval [b, b] can be normalized
to any arbitrary closed interval, independently of φ, by translation and rescaling of the parameter b
in φ(·, b). It is therefore without loss of generality that we assume all families are parametrized by
the same interval [b, b]. The family Φ is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 2. For any b, φ(x1, b) is continuous and nondecreasing in x1, and x1 − φ(x1, b) is
nondecreasing and nonconstant in x1.
Assumption 2 implies that the payment made to the seller and the profit of the winning buyer are
both nondecreasing in the realized value of the resource.
Assumption 3. For any y1 and z1,
5Assumption 1 is used in showing that if the random variables (X1,Y) are affiliated then so are the random
variables (X1, Y1, Z1); see Milgrom and Weber (1982). Lemma 2 then follows from the known relationship between
affiliation, MLR, and FOSD; see, e.g., Chapter 1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2006) and Appendix D of Krishna
(2002).
6Quoting Milgrom and Weber (1982):“Roughly, this (affiliation) means that a high value of one bidder’s estimate
makes high values of the others’ estimates more likely.” This appealing intuition for affiliation, however, suggests the
shifting of a probability distribution with the observation of a higher estimate as in first order stochastic dominance
and not the inequality that defines affiliation. de Castro (2010) provides some additional examples and references
where affiliation is used to obtain important results in economics and finance.
7In the case of second price auctions, affiliation among X1 and Y is unnecessary; all that is needed for the analysis
of Milgrom and Weber (1982) is affiliation among X1, Y1, and Z1. Even this weaker form of affiliation, however, is
strictly stronger than the MLR property we use in this paper. Affiliation among X1, Y1, and Z1 implies that an MLR
ordering property holds for any possible conditioning among these variables, e.g., (X1|Y1, Z1), (X1, Y1|Z1), (Y1|Z1),
etc.; the MLR property we use constrains only the conditioning (X1|Y1, Z1). In particular, it does not require that Y1
and Z1 be affiliated. For example, the MLR property holds under the following assumptions: the signals Y1, . . . , Yn,
have any symmetric joint pdf; a common value X is assumed (so X = Xi for all i); X is conditionally independent
of Y1, . . . , Yn given Y
∗, where Y ∗ denotes the maximum of the signal values; and the conditional distribution of X
given Y ∗ = y∗ is nondecreasing (in the MLR order as a distribution for X) with respect to y∗. That is so because Y ∗
is then a nondecreasing function of (Y1, Z1) (namely, Y
∗ = max{Y1, Z1}) and, in turn, the conditional distribution
of X is MLR nondecreasing in Y ∗.
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(i) E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is continuous and decreasing in b, nonnegative for
b = b, and nonpositive for b = b.
(ii) E [φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is continuous and increasing in b.
Assumption 3 says that the family of securities is completely ordered from the perspectives of both
the winning buyer and the seller, independently of the realized signal vector. Buyers prefer lower
security bids and the seller prefers higher security bids. Assumption 3 is satisfied if, e.g., for any
x1, φ(x1, b) is increasing in b. The seller uses the second price auction where the highest bidder
wins and pays the security bid of the second highest bidder. As discussed in the next section,
continuity together with the boundary conditions in Assumption 3(i) guarantee the existence of a
pure strategy equilibrium for the second price auction. Notice that Assumption 3(i) restricts the
possible values of I, e.g., if φ(x1, b) ≤ x1 for all x1 and b then I > 0.
Some common families of securities that satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3 are: cash φ(x1, b) = b, b ∈
[0, x]; debt φ(x1, b) = min(x1, b), b ∈ [0, x]; equity φ(x1, b) = bx1, b ∈ [0, 1−δ] for some small δ > 0;
and call option φ(x1, b) = max{x1 − x + b, 0}, b ∈ [0, x]. These families of securities are shown in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Plots of the families of securities cash, debt, equity, and call option for b
′
> b̂.
Assumptions 1-3 are in place for the rest of this paper. For a comparison between two different
families of securities, we use Ψ , {ψ(·, b) | b ∈ [b, b]} to denote a family of securities different from Φ.
All expectations and conditional expectations of interest are assumed to exist and be finite.
3 Risk Aversion
This section extends the result of DeMarzo et al. (2005) on revenue ranking of families of securities
to risk averse buyers. In a second price auction, a buyer n decides how much to bid solely based
on his signal yn. We look for a symmetric equilibrium. We start by defining a function s(y1, z1; Φ)
that will be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
s(y1, z1; Φ) , b : E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0. (1)
The uniqueness of b in (1) follows from Assumption 3. The value s(y1, z1; Φ) is the security bid
that makes buyer 1 indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring the resource given his signal
y1 and the highest signal z1 of the other buyers. Notice that the bid s(y1, z1; Φ) corresponds to
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buyer 1’s willingness to pay an amount φ(x1, s(y1, z1; Φ)) to the seller if X1 = x1. The next lemma
characterizes an important property of the function s.
Lemma 3. Assuming FOSD, the function s(y1, z1; Φ) is nondecreasing in y1 and z1.
Proof. Since x1−I−φ(x1, b) is nondecreasing in x1 by Assumption 2 and u is an increasing function,
the claim follows immediately from Lemma 1.
To simplify the analysis in the rest of this paper, we reinforce Lemma 3 with the following
additional assumption:
Assumption 4. The family of securities and the informational environments are such that the
function s(y1, z1; Φ) is increasing in y1.
Assumption 4 simplifies the analysis in this paper by insuring that ties among equilibrium bids (as
specified in Lemma 4 below) occur with probability zero. We therefore ignore the possibility of ties
in the remainder of the paper, except in footnote 9 later in this paper. Assumption 4 is satisfied
in most cases of interest; e.g., since x1 − φ(x1, b) is assumed to be nondecreasing and nonconstant
in x1, if for any x1 ∈ (x, x), 1 − FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) is increasing in y1, then Assumption 4 is
automatically satisfied. The results of this paper hold without Assumption 4 under uniform tie
breaking, though the analysis is more complicated.
The next lemma characterizes an equilibrium bidding strategy for the second price auction with
bids restricted to the family Φ. The construction of the bidding strategy follows Milgrom and
Weber (1982).
Lemma 4. Let the strategies β1, β2, . . . , βN of the buyers be identical and defined by βn(yn) ,
s(yn, yn; Φ) for all n. Assuming FOSD, the strategy vector (β1, β2, . . . , βN ) is a symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the second price auction with bids restricted to the family Φ.8
Proof. Assume that each buyer n except buyer 1 uses the strategy βn(yn) = s(yn, yn; Φ). We will
show that the best response for buyer 1 is to use the strategy β1(y1) = s(y1, y1; Φ).
Given y1, let buyer 1 bid b. Buyer 1 wins if b ≥ max{s(yn, yn; Φ) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N}. From Lemma 3,
max{s(yn, yn; Φ) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N} = s(z1, z1; Φ), where z1 = max{y2, y3, . . . , yN}. Thus, the expected
utility of buyer 1 is given by:
E
[
u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) 1{b≥s(Z1,Z1;Φ)}|Y1 = y1
]
= E
[
E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] 1{b≥s(Z1,Z1;Φ)}|Y1 = y1
]
.
From (1), E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(y1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] = 0 and from Assumption 4, s(y1, z1; Φ)
is increasing in y1. By Assumption 3, E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] is therefore
positive for Z1 < y1 and negative for Z1 > y1. The expected utility of buyer 1 is uniquely maximized
by setting b = s(y1, y1; Φ).
8Our analysis and results are only for the symmetric model and for a symmetric equilibrium that is monotone,
as is customary in the auction theory literature. The literature is sparse in the case of asymmetry and the results
obtained in the symmetric case need not apply to the asymmetric case; see Chapter 8 of Krishna (2002) for further
details.
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Because of symmetry, the seller’s expected revenue equals the expected payment made by
buyer 1 conditioned on him winning. In the symmetric equilibrium given by Lemma 4, the bid of
buyer 1 is the highest if and only if his signal is the highest among all the buyers (i.e., y1 > z1). If
buyer 1 wins, his payment is determined by the second highest security bid (i.e., s(z1, z1; Φ)). Thus,
the seller’s expected revenue from the second price auction with bids restricted to the family Φ is
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 > Z1].9
We next reformulate the definition of steepness from DeMarzo et al. (2005) using the concept
of quasi-monotonicity, as defined below:
Definition 4 (Quasi-monotone function). A function g(w) is quasi-monotone if for any w and ŵ
such that ŵ < w, if g(ŵ) > 0 then g(w) ≥ 0. A quasi-monotone function therefore crosses zero at
most once and from below.
Definition 5 (Steepness). A family of securities Φ is steeper than another family of securities Ψ
if for any b
′
, b̂ ∈ [b, b], φ(w, b′)− ψ(w, b̂) is quasi-monotone in w.
Notice that call option is steeper than equity and debt, equity is steeper than debt, and all three
of these families are steeper than cash (see Figure 1).10
Proposition 1 below states that steepness ordering is a sufficient condition under which two
different families of securities can be ranked according to the revenue they generate. The proof is
in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let Φ and Ψ be two families of securities such that Φ is steeper than Ψ. Assuming
MLR, the second price auction with bids restricted to Φ generates at least as much expected revenue
for the seller as the second price auction with bids restricted to Ψ.
A careful review of the proof of Proposition 1 shows that we in fact prove the stronger result that
the expected revenue of the seller conditioned on the winning buyer’s signal and the second highest
signal is at least as large in the case of the steeper family of securities Φ as with the family Ψ. The
revenue from the steeper family thus weakly dominates in this ex-post sense, which implies that it
is weakly better for the seller ex-ante as stated in the proposition.
The following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1:
Corollary 1. Assuming MLR, the expected revenue from the following families of securities can
be ranked as: cash ≤ debt ≤ equity ≤ call option.
The revenue ranking of families of securities of DeMarzo et al. (2005) is essentially Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 in the case of risk neutral buyers and affiliated signals and values.
9In the absence of Assumption 4, s(y1, y1; Φ) need not be increasing in y1 and ties can occur with positive
probability. However, if we assume uniform tie breaking, the seller’s expected revenue can still be shown to be
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 > Z1], implying that it is enough to assume uniform tie breaking to preserve all the results
in the paper and Assumption 4 can be dropped. To see this, notice that this is indeed the case if ties could be broken
in favor of the buyer with the highest signal (which cannot be implemented because the seller cannot infer buyers’
signals from their bids if s(y1, y1; Φ) is not invertible in y1). Let Y be an interval such that s(y1, y1; Φ) is constant for
y1 ∈ Y; let r be this constant. The event {Y1 ∈ Y, Z1 ∈ Y,buyer 1 wins under uniform tie breaking} has the same
probability as the event {Y1 ∈ Y, Z1 ∈ Y, Y1 > Z1} and for any outcome in either of these two events, the winning
buyer pays the security bid r.
10Quasi-monotonicity is not transitive and hence steepness is not transitive. Proposition 1 provides a pairwise
revenue ranking for any two families of securities that are ordered under the steepness criteria. This revenue ranking,
however, is transitive.
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4 Positive Dependence
This section addresses the role of the positive dependence assumption in the ranking of families of
securities. An example is first discussed that shows that the ranking of Proposition 1 does not hold
if MLR is relaxed to FOSD.11 The pairwise ranking of the three families of securities – debt, equity,
and call options – is completely reversed in this example in comparison to the ranking in Corollary
1. If MLR is relaxed to FOSD, the relative steepness condition must be strengthened in order to
rank two families of securities. This is accomplished by using the notion of strong steepness that
we define below.
Example 1. Consider two risk neutral buyers (i.e., u(w) = w) with independent private values.
Buyer n’s signal Yn is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Conditioned on Yn = yn, the
random variable Xn, denoting the value of buyer n, has the following conditional pdf:
fXn|Yn=yn(xn) =
{
1− yn + 6xnyn if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 13 ,
1 if 13 < xn ≤ 1.
(2)
1
)(| nyYX xf nnn


nx
3
1
6
1
1
ny

1
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
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0 1
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Figure 2: The pdf of Xn conditioned on Yn = ŷn and conditioned on Yn = yn for yn > ŷn.
Figure 2 shows the plot of fXn|Yn=yn(xn). The pairs (Xn, Yn) are i.i.d. across the buyers.
Since there are only two buyers with independent valuations, Z1 = Y2 and FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) =
FX1|Y1=y1(x1). The CDF FXn|Yn=yn(xn) is given by:
1− FXn|Yn=yn(xn) =
{
1− xn + yn(xn − 3x2n) if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 13 ,
1− xn if 13 < xn ≤ 1.
(3)
Since xn − 3x2n > 0 for xn ∈ [0, 1/3), 1 − FXn|Yn=yn(xn) is increasing in yn for xn ∈ [0, 1/3) and
is constant in yn for xn ∈ [1/3, 1]. Thus, Xn is positively dependent on Yn in the FOSD sense
and FOSD is satisfied (in this example, X1 is independent of Z1 = Y2). However, for yn > ŷn,
fXn|Yn=yn(xn)/fXn|Yn=ŷn(xn) fails to be nondecreasing in xn; the ratio is strictly greater than one
for xn ∈ (1/6, 1/3] and is equal to one for xn ∈ [1/3, 1]. Thus, MLR is not satisfied.
11Interestingly, the example assumes independent private values among the buyers; it does not rely upon interde-
pendence of values and the problems of inference that it creates, which is commonly the source of problems in models
of trading.
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Example 1 highlights the distinction between MLR and FOSD in the following sense. If the
random variable X1 is positively dependent on the random variable Y1 in the MLR sense (i.e.,
fX1|Y1=y1(x1)/fX1|Y1=ŷ1(x1) is nondecreasing in x1 for any y1 ≥ ŷ1), then conditioning on a larger
Y1 shifts the probability distribution of X1 towards the larger values of X1 everywhere in the
interval of possible values of X1. However, if the random variable X1 is positively dependent on Y1
in the FOSD sense (i.e., 1− FX1|Y1=y1(x1) is nondecreasing in y1 for any x1), then the shift of the
probability distribution towards the larger values of X1 when conditioned on a larger value of Y1 can
be localized ; in Example 1, a larger value of Y1 changes the probability distribution of X1 only in
the interval [0, 1/3], making the values in [0, 1/3] close to 1/3 more likely than the values close to 0,
while the likelihood of the values of X1 in the interval (1/3, 1] remains unchanged. Proposition 2
below uses this difference between MLR and FOSD to show that Example 1 violates the revenue
ranking given by Corollary 1. The proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. For Example 1, there exists an interval of choices for the investment I such that
for any realization of the signal vector (Y1, Y2), the expected revenue to the seller from the second
price auction with bids restricted to debt securities is higher than the expected revenue from bids
restricted to equity securities.12
Recall that Corollary 1 ranks the revenue from four families of securities in the case of MLR
as: cash ≤ debt ≤ equity ≤ call option. Numerical computation for Example 1 with investment
I = 0.2 results in the following values for the seller’s expected revenue: from cash bids = 0.3062;
from call option = 0.3078; from equity = 0.3099; and from debt = 0.3123. Thus, the ranking in
Example 1 for I = 0.2 is: cash < call option < equity < debt. Notice that (i) cash is last in each
ranking, and (ii) compared to Corollary 1, the relative pairwise ranking of debt, equity, and call
option are reversed in this example. We show below in Corollary 2 that point (i) holds generally in
the case of FOSD, i.e., call option, equity and debt all produce a greater expected revenue for the
seller than cash bids in this case. The inferiority of cash bids relative to these other securities thus
generalizes from MLR to FOSD. Because the distributions that satisfy MLR form a proper subset
of those that satisfy FOSD, the two rankings above show that any ranking of any pair of the three
families of securities of debt, equity and call options is possible within the family of distributions
that satisfy FOSD. So arriving at a definite ordering among these three families requires restricting
the dependence of signals and values beyond FOSD.
The next proposition gives a revenue ranking of families of securities that holds under FOSD
with risk averse buyers. This is achieved by strengthening the steepness condition.
Definition 6 (Strong steepness). A family of securities Φ is strongly steeper than another family
of securities Ψ if for any b
′
, b̂ ∈ [b, b] such that φ(w, b′)−ψ(w, b̂) assumes both negative and positive
values over w ∈ [x, x], φ(w, b′)− ψ(w, b̂) is nondecreasing in w.
Notice that strong steepness implies steepness. Furthermore, debt, equity, and call option are all
strongly steeper than cash.
12This ranking is robust to perturbations of the pdf fXn|Yn=yn(xn) in the L
1 sense so long as the corresponding
perturbed CDF satisfies FOSD along with the other assumptions of this paper. A simple family of distributions and
investment levels for which the ranking of debt over equity in Proposition 2 holds can be generated as follows. For
fXn|Yn=yn(xn) given by (2), consider convex combinations of the form (1−)fXn|Yn=yn(xn)+λ(xn) for  ∈ [0, 1) and
any pdf λ(xn) on [0, 1]. Such a pdf satisfies FOSD and our other assumptions because λ(xn) does not depend upon
yn. It is straightforward to modify the proof of Proposition 2 to show the existence of , I > 0 such that the ranking
of debt over equity holds in the case of (1− )fXn|Yn=yn(xn) + λ(xn) and investment I for any (ε, I) ∈ [0, ε)× (0, I]
and any pdf λ(x).
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Proposition 3. The following statements hold:
(i) Let Φ and Ψ be two families of securities such that Φ is strongly steeper than Ψ. Assuming
FOSD, the second price auction with bids restricted to Φ generates at least as much expected
revenue for the seller as the second price auction with bids restricted to Ψ.
(ii) Let Φ and Ψ be two families of securities satisfying the following assumptions:
(a) For any (X,Y) satisfying FOSD and I ∈ R such that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold for both Φ
and Ψ, Φ generates at least as much revenue as Ψ.
(b) For any b ∈ [b, b], there is a finite set Eb (possibly empty) such that for any w ∈ [x, x]\Eb,
φ and ψ are continuously differentiable, as functions of two variables, in a neighborhood
of (w, b).
Then the family Φ is strongly steeper than the family Ψ.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix C. By Assumption 2, φ(w, b) and ψ(w, b) are differentiable
in w almost everywhere; and by Assumption 3, E
[
φ(W, b)
]
and E
[
ψ(W, b)
]
are differentiable in b
with positive derivatives almost everywhere. The regularity condition (b) above imposes only mild
additional smoothness requirements on the securities. In particular, this assumption is satisfied by
cash, debt, equity, and call option.
As with Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 3(i) establishes the stronger result that the
seller’s expected revenue conditional on the two highest signals is larger for the strongly steeper
family of securities. The following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3(i):
Corollary 2. Assuming FOSD, the expected revenue from debt, equity, or call option are at least
as large as the expected revenue from cash.
It is instructive to compare the revenue ranking of Proposition 3(i) to the ranking in DeMarzo
et al. (2005). Recall Example 1. As noted above, MLR shifts the distribution of X1 across its
support as y1 increases while FOSD may only shift this distribution locally. Steepness is funda-
mentally a local condition that restricts how a security from one family crosses a security from
another family (i.e., it crosses at most once and from below). MLR is a global notion of positive
dependence that allows this local comparison of two families to determine a ranking based upon the
seller’s expected revenue. In moving from MLR to FOSD, however, this ranking no longer holds.
Steepness is replaced in Proposition 3(i) by strong steepness that compares two families of securities
across the entire support of X1. DeMarzo et al. (2005) thus apply a local condition on families
of securities together with a global condition on positive dependence in order to rank families of
securities in terms of expected revenue. When the global condition on positive dependence MLR is
weakened to the condition FOSD that may only bind locally, we must strengthen the comparison
of the securities to a global condition that holds across the support of X1 in order to be able to
rank the families.
Application of Proposition 3(i) is illustrated further by the revenue ranking in Abhishek et al.
(2013) of profit sharing securities, which are inspired by spectrum auctions in India. A fraction
α ∈ [0, 1) defines securities as follows. Setting I = 0, in the profit-loss security, the winning buyer’s
payment to the seller consists of a cash bid b along with an α share of the return x− b,
φplα (x, b) = b+ α (x− b) .
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In the profit-only security, the winning buyer’s payment to the seller consists of a cash bid along
with an α share of the return x− b when it is positive but with no additional payment when it is
not,
φpoα (x, b) = b+ αmax {0, x− b} .
Let Φplα and Φ
po
α denote respectively the families of profit-loss and profit-only securities that are
determined by α and indexed by the range of possible cash bids. It is straightforward to see that:
(i) if α > α′, then Φplα is strongly steeper than Φplα′ and Φ
po
α is strongly steeper than Φ
po
α′ ; (ii) for
fixed α, Φplα is strongly steeper than Φ
po
α . Proposition 3(i) then implies that the seller’s expected
revenue in the second price auction with either profit-loss or profit-only securities is nondecreasing
in the share α, and for fixed α the expected revenue is weakly higher with profit and loss sharing
as compared to profit only sharing.
We conclude with intuition on why a strongly steeper family of securities generates a higher
expected revenue for the seller in the case of risk neutral buyers. Let Φ and Ψ denote two families
of securities such that Φ is strongly steeper than Ψ. Assume that y1 > z1 so buyer 1 wins regardless
of whether bids are from Φ or Ψ. Buyer 1 in each case pays the bid of the buyer who observed
signal z1. His ex-post payment is equal to φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) if bids are from Φ and the value X1 of
the resource is equal to x1, and the corresponding payment in the case of Ψ is ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)).
In our symmetric model with risk neutral buyers, s(z1, z1; Φ) and s(z1, z1; Ψ) are bids that make
buyer 1 indifferent to winning conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1:
E [φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = E [X1 − I | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
= E [ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (4)
The seller would thus expect to receive the same revenue from the families Φ and Ψ if the highest
and the second highest signals are the same, i.e., Y1 = Z1 = z1. Buyer 1 wins the auction, however,
when his signal Y1 = y1 is greater than z1. His expected payment to the seller is therefore calculated
conditioned on Y1 = y1 > z1. Intuitively, FOSD means that a larger realized signal Y1 = y1 shifts
the distribution of the return X1 from the resource towards its larger values. This shift increases
the expected payment to the seller from the strongly steeper family of securities Φ more than that
from Ψ because the ex-post payment to the seller increases more rapidly as a function of x1 in the
case of a steeper security. Compared to Y1 = z1 for which we have the equality (4), for Y1 = y1 > z1
we have
E [φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ E [ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (5)
We depict this intuition in Figure 3 for the case in which Φ represents equity shares and Ψ
represents cash. The lines represent the equilibrium bids in these two families for a given value
of z1. On the left is the density fX1|Y1=z1,Z1=z1(x1) of X1 conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1. Relative
to this density, the expected value of the payments φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) and ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) are
equal. On the right is the density fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) of X1 conditioned on Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1 for
y1 > z1. The expected value of φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) exceeds the expected value of ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ))
relative to this second density, reflecting both the shift of the density given the observation of the
larger signal Y1 = y1 > z1 and the relative strong steepness of the two families of securities.
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Figure 3: Payments from security bids as functions of X1, overlaid on the pdf of X1 conditioned on
Y1 = Z1 = z1 (left), and the pdf of X1 conditioned on Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1 for y1 > z1 (right). The family
Φ represents equity shares and the family Ψ represents cash payments.
5 The English Auction
We summarize in this section the extension to the case of the English auction of all results from
Sections 3 and 4 using strengthened versions of MLR and FOSD. The English auction is an ascend-
ing price auction with a continuously increasing price. At each price level, a buyer decides whether
to drop out or not. The price level and the number of active buyers are publicly known at any
time. The auction ends when the second to last buyer drops out and the winner pays the price at
which this happens.
If bids are restricted to a family of securities, then the winning buyer pays the security bid at
which the second to last buyer drops out. The security bids at which different buyers drop out allow
the remaining buyers to infer the signals of those who have dropped out. A buyer’s bidding strategy
thus takes into account the number of active buyers and the inferred signals of the other buyers
who have dropped out. This requires modifying MLR and FOSD such that the random variable
X1 is positively dependent not only on Y1 and Z1 but on the entire vector of signals of the other
buyers, i.e., on (Y1, Y2, . . . , YN ). With this modification, an equilibrium for the English auction
with bids restricted to a family of securities can be characterized by following the construction of
equilibrium for the English auction with cash bids in Milgrom and Weber (1982).13 Using this
characterization of equilibrium, all proofs in this paper extend in a straightforward manner to the
case of the English auction. In particular, the analysis in Example 1 of Section 4 holds for the
English auction as well because it is strategically equivalent to the second price auction in the case
of only two buyers.
6 Conclusions
DeMarzo et al. (2005) identify the relative steepness of two families of securities as the critical
factor in determining which of the two families generates the higher expected revenue for the seller
in the second price and the first price auctions. For the second price auction, we first generalize
this ranking to include the case of risk averse buyers. We then demonstrate the dependence of
this ranking on the underlying positive dependence assumption among values and signals. An
example is provided in which positive dependence is relaxed from MLR to FOSD. The pairwise
13See also Abhishek et al. (2013) concerning the English auction with a profit-sharing contract.
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revenue ranking of common families of securities – debt, equity, and call options – is reversed in
this example from the ranking of DeMarzo et al. (2005). The cause of this reversal is that positive
dependence in the MLR sense globally restricts dependence while positive dependence in the FOSD
sense may only restrict it locally; while the local condition of relative steepness is sufficient to rank
families in the case of MLR, it must be strengthened in order to obtain a ranking under the less
restrictive condition of FOSD. We achieve this by identifying relative strong steepness as a necessary
and sufficient condition for comparing two families of securities in the case of FOSD. This result is
significant because FOSD is the property that is most commonly cited in auction theory to motivate
an assumption of positive dependence among values and signals. These results extend to the case
of the English auction.
A Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the following definition:
Definition 7 (Single crossing). A function g1(w) single crosses a function g2(w) from below if
there exists wc such that g1(w) ≤ g2(w) for w ≤ wc and g1(w) ≥ g2(w) for w ≥ wc.
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 below provide the key steps in establishing Proposition 1.
Lemma 5. Let W be a random variable taking values in some interval J1, and let gi : J1 7→ J2
for i = 1, 2 be nondecreasing functions with values in some interval J2. Let g1 single cross g2 from
below and wc be a crossing point. Let h be any concave function. Then the following holds:
1. If E [g1(W )] = E [g2(W )], then E [h(g1(W ))] ≤ E [h(g2(W ))].
2. If E [h(g1(W ))] = E [h(g2(W ))] and h
′
(g1(wc)) > 0, then E [g1(W )] ≥ E [g2(W )].
Proof. The first claim is from Lemma 3 of Ohlin (1969). We therefore turn to the second claim,
the proof of which closely follows the proof of the first claim.
Define Fi(t) , P [gi(W ) ≤ t], i = 1, 2, and let t0 = g1(wc). Clearly, F1 and F2 are probability
distributions. If t < t0, the event g2(W ) ≤ t implies the event g1(W ) ≤ t, hence F1(t) ≥ F2(t).
Similarly, if t > t0, the event g1(W ) ≤ t implies the event g2(W ) ≤ t, hence F1(t) ≤ F2(t).
Since h is concave, it is differentiable almost everywhere (in particular, the right and the left
derivatives exist everywhere). Hence, h(t) = h(t0) +
∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)dr, where h
′
can be taken as the right
derivative of h. For i = 1, 2, regard gi(W ) as a random variable with probability measure Fi. The
expected value of h(gi(W )) reduces as follows:
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E [h(gi(W ))] =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(t)dFi(t) = h(t0) +
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)drdFi(t),
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
∫ t0
t
h
′
(r)drdFi(t) +
∫ ∞
t0
∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)drdFi(t),
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
∫ r
−∞
dFi(t)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
∫ ∞
r
dFi(t)h
′
(r)dr,
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
Fi(r)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
(1− Fi(r))h′(r)dr,
= h(t0)−
∫ ∞
−∞
Fi(r)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
h
′
(r)dr.
Hence,
E [h(g1(W ))]− E [h(g2(W ))] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t)dt. (6)
Substituting h(t) = t in (6) implies
E [g1(W )]− E [g2(W )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F2(t)− F1(t))dt. (7)
Since h
′
(t) is nonincreasing in t, F2(t) − F1(t) ≤ 0 for t ≤ t0, and F2(t) − F1(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ t0, we
have,
(F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t) ≤ (F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t0), for all t. (8)
Combining (6)-(8) results in
E [h(g1(W ))]− E [h(g2(W ))] ≤ h′(t0) (E [g1(W )]− E [g2(W )]) . (9)
The result then immediately follows from (9).
Lemma 6. Let a function g single cross zero from below. Suppose E [g(X1)|Y1 = ŷ1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0
for some ŷ1 and z1. Assuming MLR, E [g(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0 for any y1 > ŷ1.
Proof. Since conditioning on Z1 = z1 plays no role in the above claim, for notational convenience
define hX1|Y1=y1(x1) , fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1), which omits Z1 = z1. Let w0 be the point at which g
crosses zero from below. Since hX1|Y1=y1(x1)/hX1|Y1=yˆ1(x1) is increasing in x1, g(x1) ≤ 0 for
x1 ≤ w0, and g(x1) ≥ 0 for x1 ≥ w0, we get
g(x1)
hX1|Y1=y1(x1)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(x1)
≥ g(x1)
hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
for all x1. (10)
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Then,
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] =
∫ x
x
g(w)hX1|Y1=y1(w)dw,
=
∫ x
x
g(w)
hX1|Y1=y1(w)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)dw,
≥
∫ x
x
g(w)
hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)dw,
=
hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
E [g(X1)|Y1 = ŷ1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is from (10). This completes the proof.
We can now prove Proposition 1. The seller’s revenue if bids are restricted to the family Φ is
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 > Z1] and is E [ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 > Z1] if bids are restricted to the
family Ψ. To prove Proposition 1, it suffices to show that for any y1 > z1,
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ E [ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (11)
From (1), for any z1,
E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ)))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = 0
= E [u(X1 − I − ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ)))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (12)
If either φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) < ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) or φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) > ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) for all x1
then (12) would not be true. Hence, φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) and ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) must cross each other
as functions of x1. Since Φ is steeper than Ψ, φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses
zero from below. This implies that x1−ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses x1−φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) from
below. This, along with (12), and u being concave and increasing, allow for an application of the
second part of Lemma 5, and results in the following inequality:
E [X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [X1 − I − ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (13)
Hence,
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0. (14)
Since φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ))−ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses zero from below, (14) and Lemma 6 imply
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0, (15)
for y1 > z1. This establishes (11) and the proof is complete.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
We first explain how the example was devised. Recall the statement of Lemma 6 from the preceding
section. The proof of Proposition 1 is an application of Lemma 6 in which for any value of z1: (i)
g(x1) = φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)), where Φ is a steeper family than Ψ; (ii) ŷ1 equals
z1; (iii) Lemma 6 is applied to derive inequality (15), which is the conclusion that the expected
payment by buyer 1 in the event that he trades is greater with the family of securities Φ than with Ψ.
Example 1 is constructed with the goal of making this last step false so that the steeper family of
securities produces a lower expected payment by buyer 1. The key observation is that while the
function g(x1) is assumed by Lemma 6 to single cross zero from below, this does not preclude g(x1)
from decreasing for values of x1 below the point at which it crosses zero. In Example 1, a larger
value of Y1 changes the probability density of X1 only in the interval [0, 1/3], making the values
in [0, 1/3] closer to 1/3 more likely and the values near 0 less likely, while the probability density
over [1/3, 1] remains unaffected. If g(x1) is decreasing over [0, 1/3], then conditioning on a larger
value of Y1 can decrease the expected value of g(X1) over [0, 1] and thereby reverse the conclusion
of Proposition 1. As we show below, this in fact occurs for a range of values of the investment I
and for each realization of the signal vector (Y1, Y2) in the case in which Φ is the equity family
and Ψ is the debt family.
We begin by choosing the investment parameter I to ensure that the relevant g(x1) in the case
of debt and equity crosses zero at a value larger than 1/3. In the case of debt securities, the optimal
bid b of buyer 1 when his signal equals zero is determined by the equation
E [X1 − I −min(X1, b) |Y1 = 0] = 0,
⇔E [X1 − I |Y1 = 0] = E [min(X1, b) |Y1 = 0] . (16)
With foresight to the use of g(x1) below, we wish to ensure that the optimal bid of buyer 1 when
his signal equals zero exceeds 1/3. The left side of (16) is decreasing in I and the right side is
nondecreasing in b. At I = 0.2 and b = 1/3, the left side strictly exceeds the right side. As a
consequence, we conclude that there is a value I > 0.2 such that for all I < I, the value of b that
solves (16) strictly exceeds 1/3. We therefore fix the investment at some value I˜ ∈ (0, I).
Consider an arbitrary realization (y˜1, y˜2) of the signal vector such that buyer 1 wins, i.e., y˜1 > y˜2.
Given y˜2, let b
d denote the bid of buyer 2 when he bids with debt securities and be his bid when he
bids with equity securities. It is sufficient to prove that
E [beX1|Y1 = y˜1] < E
[
min(X1, b
d)|Y1 = y˜1
]
, (17)
where the left hand side denotes the seller’s expected revenue given (y˜1, y˜2) in the case of equity
securities and the right hand side denotes his expected revenue in the case of debt securities. We
are using here the fact that X1 is independent of Y2 in this example.
Lemma 4 states that the bids bd and be satisfy:
E
[
X1 − I˜ − beX1|Y1 = y˜2
]
= 0 = E
[
X1 − I˜ −min(X1, bd)|Y1 = y˜2
]
, (18)
⇒E
[
beX1 −min(X1, bd)|Y1 = y˜2
]
= 0. (19)
We next apply (18) to bound the bids bd and be. Since I˜ > 0, it is straightforward to see that
be < 1. Our foresight in choosing I˜ is now useful: because E
[
X1 − I˜ −min(X1, bd) |Y1 = y1
]
is
increasing in y1, the solution b
d to (18) is at least as large as its value at y1 = 0 and so b
d > 1/3.
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Define g(x1) , bex1 −min(x1, bd). The function g is decreasing in the interval [0, bd] and thus
decreasing in [0, 1/3]. From (19), E[g(X1)|Y1 = y˜2] = 0. Hence,
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1] = E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1]− E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜2]
=
∫ 1
0
g(w)fX1|Y1=y˜1(w)dw −
∫ 1
0
g(w)fX1|Y1=y˜2(w)dw. (20)
From (2), for w ∈ (1/3, 1], fX1|Y1=y˜1(w) = fX1|Y1=y˜2(w) = 1. For w ∈ [0, 1/3], fX1|Y1=y1(w) =
1− y1 + 6wy1 and g(w) = (be − 1)w. Equation (20) therefore simplifies to:
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1] =
∫ 1/3
0
g(w)
(
fX1|Y1=y˜1(w)− fX1|Y1=y˜2(w)
)
dw,
=
∫ 1/3
0
(be − 1)w ((1− y˜1 + 6wy˜1)− (1− y˜2 + 6wy˜2)) dw,
=
∫ 1/3
0
(be − 1)(y˜1 − y˜2)w(6w − 1)dw,
= (be − 1)(y˜1 − y˜2) 1
54
< 0, (21)
where the last inequality is because y˜1 > y˜2 and b
e < 1. This establishes (17) and the proof is
complete.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of part (i):
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Proposition 1. The main difference is in how
the concluding inequality that ranks the expected payments of the winning buyer under different
families of securities is derived using FOSD and strong steepness instead of MLR and steepness.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, it suffices to show that (11) holds for any y1 > z1. The argument
in the proof of Proposition 1 implies that φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) must cross ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) as functions
of x1. Strong steepness requires that φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) is nondecreasing in x1
and hence x1 −ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses x1 − φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) from below. Inequality (14)
then follows by the same argument as before, implying:
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
⇒E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0.
The last inequality that proves the result is from an application of Lemma 1, using the fact that
φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) is nondecreasing in x1 (i.e., strong steepness) together with
FOSD.
Proof of part (ii):
It suffices to consider only the case of two risk neutral buyers and (X,Y) satisfying FOSD such
that the (Xi, Yi) pairs for different buyers are independent and identically distributed. We also
assume without loss of generality that the Yi’s are distributed over the interval [0, 1].
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Suppose Φ and Ψ are two families of securities satisfying conditions (a) and (b) of Proposition
3(ii). Let b̂ ∈ (b, b) and b˜ ∈ (b, b) be such that φ(w, b̂)−ψ(w, b˜) assumes both negative and positive
values over w ∈ [x, x]. Let wo be a point in [x, x]\Eb, and let α̂ , ∂φ(w,̂b)∂w
∣∣
w=wo
and α˜ , ∂ψ(w,˜b)∂w
∣∣
w=wo
.
It suffices to prove that α̂ ≥ α˜.
For  ≥ 0, let the function ρ be defined by:
ρ(t) =

− 13 if − 13 ≤ t < 0,

1
3 if 0 ≤ t ≤  13 ,
0 otherwise.
(22)
Note that
∫∞
∞ tρ
(t)dt = .
Since φ(w, b̂) − ψ(w, b˜) assumes both negative and positive values, there exists a pdf fW over
[x, x] that is continuously differentiable, strictly positive, and such that if random variable W has
this pdf, then E
[
φ(W, b̂)
]
= E
[
ψ(W, b˜)
]
. Define r , E
[
φ(W, b̂)
]
= E
[
ψ(W, b˜)
]
and let I = E
[
W
]−r.
We describe joint distributions for (X1, Y1), parameterized by  ≥ 0, using the pdf fW and the
function ρ. The random variable Y1 is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], and
f X1|Y1=y1(x1) = fW (x1) + y1ρ
(x1 − wo). (23)
In words, the conditional pdf of X1 given Y1 = y1 is obtained from fW by shifting a small amount
of probability mass, proportional to y1, from just below wo to just above wo. We shall only consider
 small enough that the conditional pdf is nonnegative and the rectangular set, (support of ρ(w−
wo))×(an open interval containing b̂), is contained in a set of continuous differentiability of φ, and
the analogous condition holds for b˜ and ψ. For each such , (X,Y) satisfies FOSD. If  = 0,
the signals are independent of the values and the pdf of X1 is identical to the pdf of W . By
construction, E
[
W − I − φ(W, b̂)] = 0. Assumption 3(ii) then implies that for  = 0 and any y,
E
[
X1−I−φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y
]
> 0 and E
[
X1−I−φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y
]
< 0. By the smoothness conditions
in Proposition 3(ii), E
[
X1 − I − φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y
]
is continuous in . Hence, for small values of ,
our choice of I and (X,Y) satisfy Assumption 3(i) for family Φ. The same holds true for Ψ.
Let R(; Φ) denote the expected revenue from the family of securities Φ for  parameterized
random variables (X,Y); define R(; Ψ) similarly. By the assumed revenue ranking, R(; Φ) ≥
R(; Ψ) for all  being considered. If  = 0, both buyers bidding b̂ is the symmetric equilibrium
for the family of securities Φ, both buyers bidding b˜ is the symmetric equilibrium for the family of
securities Ψ, and the revenue for each set of securities is r. Hence, R(0; Φ) = R(0; Ψ). It will be
shown below that the derivative of R(; Φ) with respect to  at zero satisfies R′(0; Φ) = (1 + α̂)/3.
Similarly, R′(0; Ψ) = (1+α˜)/3. By the revenue ranking, we must have R′(0; Φ) ≥ R′(0; Ψ), implying
α̂ ≥ α˜. It remains to show that R′(0; Φ) = (1 + α̂)/3.
Consider the family Φ. The hypotheses imply that E
[
φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y
]
is continuously differen-
tiable in both  and b for  in a neighborhood of zero and b in a neighborhood of b̂. Moreover,
E [X1 | Y1 = y1] = E [W ] + y1, (24)
E [φ(X1, b) | Y1 = y1] = r + y1
∂φ(w, b)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wo
+ o(), (25)
where (25) is obtained by the Taylor series representation of φ(w, b) centered at w = wo, for a fixed
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b in a small neighborhood of b̂. Here, lim→0+ o()/ = 0. Equivalently,
∂E [φ(X1, b) | Y1 = y1]
∂
∣∣∣∣∣
=0
= y1
∂φ(w, b)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wo
. (26)
Since the signal and value pairs are independent, the function s(y1, z1), defined by (1) for (X
,Y),
depends only on y1; we write it is as s
(y1). It is characterized by the equation
E [X1 − I − φ(X1, s(y1)) | Y1 = y1] = 0.
For a given y1, (24), (26), and the smoothness conditions of Proposition 3(ii)(b) imply that the
partial derivatives of E
[
X1 − I − φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1
]
with respect of  and b are continuous for  in
some small interval [0, ) and b in a small neighborhood of b̂; and the partial derivative with respect
to b is nonzero. By the implicit function theorem, s(y1) is differentiable in  and satisfies:
∂s(y1)
∂
= −
∂E
[
X1 − I − φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1
]
∂
∣∣∣∣
b=s(y1)
∂E
[
X1 − I − φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1
]
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=s(y1)
=
y1
(
1− ∂φ(w, s
(y1))
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wo
)
∂E
[
φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1
]
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=s(y1)
. (27)
Notice that at  = 0, X1 is independent of Y1, s
(y1) = b̂ for any y1, and X

1 and W are identical
in distribution. For notational convenience, define D , ∂E[φ(W,b)]∂b
∣∣
b=b̂
. Then from (26), (27) and
continuity of derivatives,
∂s(y1)
∂
∣∣∣∣
=0
=
y1(1− α̂)
D
, (28)
and
∂E [φ(X1, s(y2)) | Y1 = y1]
∂
∣∣∣∣
=0
=
∂E
[
φ(X1, b̂)|Y1 = y1
]
∂
∣∣∣∣
=0
+
(
∂E [φ(W, b)]
∂b
∂s(y2)
∂
) ∣∣∣∣
=0,b=b̂
,
= α̂y1 + (1− α̂)y2. (29)
Next, notice that
R(; Φ) = E [φ(X1, s(Y2)) | Y1 > Y2] = E [E [φ(X1, s(Y2)) | Y1, Y2] | Y1 > Y2] . (30)
Since E
[
φ(X1, b)|Y1, Y2
]
is continuously differentiable in  and b, and s(Y2) is differentiable in ,
E
[
φ(X1, s
(Y2))|Y1, Y2
]
is continuously differentiable in . Additionally, because Yi’s take values in
finite interval [0, 1], in order to compute the derivative of R(; Φ), we can take the derivative inside
the outer expectation in (30).
∂R(; Φ)
∂
∣∣∣∣
=0
= E
[
∂E [φ(X1, s(Y2)) | Y1, Y2]
∂
∣∣∣∣∣
=0
∣∣∣∣∣Y1 > Y2
]
,
= E [α̂Y1 + (1− α̂)Y2 | Y1 > Y2] ,
=
1 + α̂
3
,
where the second equality follows from (29). Therefore, R′(0; Φ) = (1 + α̂)/3, as required.
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